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Prepared by:
Alfonso Abente
Dejana Perrone
Ashley Souther
Viktor ZikasDate
April 2, 2020
Course:
SIS 609.001
Spring 2003
Conflict Analysis and Resolution
Introduction
Location
This conflict is currently taking place in the Punjab Province of
Pakistan. Punjab lies in the eastern portion of the country
bordering the Punjab region of India. It is comprised of 10
districts covering 205,344 square km of Pakistan's 803,905 square
km. The capital city of Punjab is Lahore. With a population of 5.5
million, Lahore is the second largest city in Pakistan. Pakistan
claimed its independence from Britain on August 14, 1947.
Analysis of the Parties
Central Parties
There are two parties to this conflict. They are 1) the former
tenant farmers represented under the association Anjuman Muzareen
Punjab (AMP, Punjab Tenant Association) 2) the government of
Punjab represented by the Punjab Seed Corporation (PSC), the Okara
Military Farms, the Renala Military Farms, and the livestock
department. The AMP is a part of the People's Rights Movement, a
confederation of diverse social movements working for the rights
of dispossessed and disadvantaged Pakistanis (Amirali, 2002). The
PSC and the military farms are agencies of the government. There
are no significant groupings or factions within either party.
Peripheral Parties
The Kissan Board, a private group advocating for the welfare of
farmers, Caritas Multan, an NGO, the National Commission for
Justice and Peace (NCJP), representing legal rights of the
farmers, and the Labor Party Pakistan (LPP) have entered in
support of the farmers or in condemnation of government violence (IRIN,
2002). GoPunjab, the Revenue Department, and the Court of Law are
involved on the government side (Jacob, 2003).
Identities of the Parties
The Farmers
The AMP was formed in October 2001 and is made up of Muslim and
Christian farmers. The AMP has units in all seven villages of the
Punjab Seed Corporation. The population of these villages is about
22,000, or 2,500 households. The AMP claims to represent as many
as 1 million people. About 70% are Muslim and about 30% are
Christians (Jacob, 2003). Christians comprise about 1-2% of the
total population in Pakistan while Muslims comprise about 97%
(http://www.ms.uky.edu/~naveed/pakistan/facts.html, March 20,
2003).
The AMP farmers are landless farmers who have worked under tenancy
status as established by British colonial rule under the "Abadkari
Scheme" in the early 1900s. The Abadkari Scheme undertook the
relocation of Muslim and Christian families from East Punjab to
clear and till newly irrigated land in the Punjab (Jacob, P.,
2003; Amirali, A., 2002). Agricultural workers currently comprise
about 47% of the labor force in Pakistan (http://www.pakistaninformation.com/pakistanstats.html,
March 20, 2021). Literacy among farmers, especially the
Christians, is the lowest in the country where about 35-43% of the
population is literate. Thirty-five percent of the population in
Pakistan lives below the poverty line (http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pk.html,
March 20, 2021). Most of the 1 million farmers that belong to AMP
live below the poverty line (http://www.foodfirst.org/action/cgar/pakistanrepression.html,
February 20, 2021).
The Government
The provincial government of Punjab owns the land. Various
government agencies such as the PSC, the military, and the
livestock department manage the land. The government of Pakistan
is a military government, and the military comprises half a
million people (Moreau, 2002).
Relationship of the Parties to Each Other
Oppression, exploitation, misunderstanding, suspicion, mistrust,
and coercion (intimidation, threats and violence) have marked the
relationship of the parties (Jacob, 2003; IRIN, 2002; Moreau,
2002).
Capabilities, Resources, and Limitations
The Farmers
The AMP is limited in all areas of capabilities and resources.
Their strongest asset is that they have been able to organize
themselves and maintain the organization for the duration of this
conflict. Otherwise, they are heavily reliant on outside
assistance for representation and humanitarian aid. The farmers
have adopted a mode of nonviolent resistance, as they are not
equipped with weapons more powerful than “thappa” sticks (see
explanation in ‘expression of conflict’ section).
Although minority peoples in Pakistan have representation in
Parliament, it is not significant and they do not have input at
the provincial level to elect representatives. They are accruing
debt to family members and moneylenders, children have not started
school and no marriages have taken place this year (Jacob, 2003).
The Military
The military commands 45% of the national budget. Although limited
on cash, it compensates its members with free housing, education,
healthcare, lifetime employment including post-service retirement,
and land. The government, therefore the military, has owned the
farmland since independence. The military has at its disposal
guns, trucks, access to public services (fuel, water,
electricity), as well as food, income and goods from other
services it owns and foreign trade. The military owns and runs two
of Pakistan's largest industrial and business conglomerates, the
Fauji Foundation and the Army Welfare Trust. These companies
extend to banking, real estate, airlines, insurance, and
construction (Moreau, 2002).
Background and Historical Context of the Conflict
The 1902 construction of the Lower Bari Doab canal brought
irrigation to a previously barren land composed of rain forests
and sand dunes. The colonial government brought in farming
families to till and cultivate the land under the "Abadkari
Scheme." The land was owned by the government and continued to be
after independence in 1947. The farmers had been granted tenant
status under the Tenancy Act of 1887, which defined the
tenant-landlord relationship, and officially maintained that
status until June 7, 2020 (Jacob, 2003; Amirali, 2002; Nawas,
2001).
In 1954, the post-independence government of Punjab created the
PSC, one of the current government agencies that manages the farms
in the Punjab. At the time, the objective of the government was to
produce and promote good quality wheat and cotton seeds. Part of
the legislation determined that farmers would keep 60% of the
crops and the government would receive payment in kind for the use
of the land equaling 40% of the crops. The agreement also
stipulated that the farmers would receive subsidies of seed,
fertilizer, and water.
Challenges to the tenancy agreement began in 1975 with Writ
Petition No. 1124/1975. For 18 years this petition was appealed,
dismissed, and resubmitted until February 28, 2021 when it was
determined by the government of Punjab that "the produce of
agricultural land belonging to the government shall be shared in
the ratio of 50:50" (Jacob, 2003).
The legislation now in contention was first presented in June
2000. It proposed to change the status of peasant farmers from
tenant to lessee. Under the proposed legislation farmers would be
granted initial 3-5 year leases (Amirali, 2002), after which they
would be required to "Thekka", or bid for land under cultivation
(Jacob, 2003). The highest bidder would receive the land.
This received an unfavorable and intense response from the tenant
farmers. They feared being evicted and demanded land ownership.
Sentiments of resistance were shared and spread, and farmers
organized themselves into the AMP in October 2001. Despite
objection from the tenant farmers, the Punjab government passed
the legislation changing the status from tenancy to lessee on June
7, 2002. As the government continued to demonstrate its
unwillingness to negotiate and its willingness to use violent and
lethal force, fear and suspicion grew, and objectives solidified
culminating in the coining of the slogan, "Ownership or Death"
(Jacob, 2003).
Analysis of Sources of the Conflict
The sources of the Punjab land dispute can be viewed from two
perspectives. The AMP asserts that the national government has
arbitrarily altered the tenant system over the past few decades
without consultation; government started those changes by changing
the share formula from 60% (retained by farmers) - 40% (given to
government) to 50%-50% respectively. It is also important to
mention that farmers are not allowed to sell their crop in the
open market. Moreover, the June 2002 legislation changed the
status of the farmers to lessee and required farmers to pay $50
rent, permitting the government to legally remove the farmers if
they fail to pay the rent. In response, the AMP wants to purchase
the land or revert back to the tenant system.
However, the government looks at the conflict through a different
lens. The government has compared their land reforms to those made
by other governments and international organizations, making it
look like a common practice worldwide. More importantly, the
government views farmers as trying to ‘milk the system.’ The
government cannot comprehend why farmers are so discontent, after
the government has generously provided three safety nets for the
farmers: (1) the new lease system permitting the next of kin to
remain on the land, (2) permitting the purchase of houses on
governmental property, and (3) the government has purchased land
from nearly 15,000 farmers at market prices (Moreau & Hussaun,
2002).
However, two different perspectives given by the parties provide
only a partial explanation about the source of the conflict,
therefore, by utilizing a prism of John Burton’s ‘eight individual
needs’ (only select needs will be discussed) a more complete
picture will be presented. According to Burton, individual needs
are those things without which individuals cannot function in
society. The first need is responsiveness from the central
authority. The failure of the government to respond to the needs
of the farmers plants the seeds of conflict. For example, protests
from the farmers at the introduction of the legislation in June
2000 fell upon deaf ears in the Punjab government. The
non-responsiveness of the government provides a glimpse into how
the escalation of the conflict occurred. The fear of the
government was that, should they capitulate to the farmers
demands, it may have had a ripple effect throughout the Pakistani
society, thus encouraging other groups to revolt.
The second basic need applicable to this case is the need for
security. One aspect of security is financial security. A large
portion of the farmers are substantially in debt due primarily to
the recent increase of farming taxes. If the farmers were able to
gain ownership of the land, this would provide collateral to
initiate the difficult path back to solvency.
The government has used coercive strategies, described in the next
section, against the farmers. The third need is for distributive
justice (Burton’s 5th). The majority of the farmers have been
tending ‘their’ land for over hundred years. These farmers
ardently believe the land is rightful theirs and only seek
justice-ownership of the lands.
The fourth need is the need for meaning (Burton’s 6th). These
farmers have been labeled ‘landless’ farmers, which has had an
immense psychological impact on the farmers. Land is a determinant
of identity in an agrarian society. Without ownership of land,
farmers lose a sense of meaning, self-worth, and recognition in
society.
The fifth is the need for control (Burton’s 8th) . The new lease
arrangement empowers the government to swiftly oust the farmers
from the land, thus removing control over their own lives.
Kriesberg's paradigm provides insight into how the loss of control
affects the process of escalation. The government has, in the
past, offered land as a ‘perk’ to military officials and other
loyal constituents. The farmers perceived the new lease system as
an avenue for the government to quickly remove them from the most
profitable lands so the government can hand the land to its loyal
constituencies.
Issues in the Punjab Land Tenure Dispute
This conflict really is a confluence of different issues – issues
that overlap, extenuate, and exacerbate each other to form the
conflict dynamic. This becomes apparent when examining the
positions of the respective parties; they both have different
issues that they feel are important and that drive the conflict.
One such aspect is the legal aspect of the conflict. To hear the
government’s side of the conflict is to hear that it is about its
legal precedent and the government's right to change the farmers'
status. Their view of the movement is that the Tenants Association
should take their grievance to the courts rather than the streets.
The official position is that economic reform of the outdated and
inefficient state-run farm enterprise system (ala World Bank
regulations) is the reason for the 2002 legislation. Also, they
claim a precedent for the state reclamation of land after the
expiration of old British 99-year leases. “Just like Hong Kong
going back to China, these old British leases are now running out.
Though it is tough on the tenants, it is right and proper for
these lands to go to the government,” said Feroz Khan, Pakistani
Brigadier General (Khan, March 13th).
The social aspect of the conflict, however, is stressed by the
farmers. They view themselves as the oppressed agrarian class in a
semi-feudal society ruled by the military elite. In this sense,
the conflict has been repeated time again throughout history when
unfair land policies drive the farmers to social fermentation and
mobilization. Such a conflict led to the 1887 Land Tenure Act
which protected the occupancy rights of small cultivators from
absentee landowners. Whether it is the British or the Pakistani
military, the farmers feel that they are the victims of unfair
land policies and usury at the hands of the authorities. The only
solution they see is for Pakistan to follow the road to
modernization that leads through progressive land reform for the
agrarian class.
The government, however, insists that there is more to the Tenant
Association movement than grassroots unrest. They maintain that
there are political dimensions to the conflict and that dissident
PPP (Pakistan Peoples Party) cabals are “making hay” with the
farmers' issues. “The authorities believe that some political
groups and vested interests are preventing the farmers from
reaching an understanding with the government” (IRIN news).
Although the government dismisses the movement as being
politically motivated and insincere, the AMP leadership has
consistently challenged the government on human rights and land
reform policies since the 1970s. They claim the heritage of the
South Asians who fought for independence from British Imperialism
and also the activists opposed to the Pakistan Army’s misconduct
in East Pakistan (Bangladesh).
The most obvious issue of contention in this conflict is the
dispute over resources. Both parties agree that the conflict is
essentially over land and the resources it produces, although they
have different versions of the issue. The farmers believe that the
2002 legislation is just a ruse to force the farmers off the
productive land, take away their right to occupancy, and force
them once again to cultivate untamed jungle as they were made to
do by the British 100 years ago. The government, however,
maintains that they pursue resources through modernization of
economic policy and that the farmers are being given a fair chance
to continue farming.
The different issues involved in this conflict attest to the
complexity of the situation. Not one, but all of them must be
appreciated to fully understand the conflict dynamic and the
relation of the parties involved.
Expression of the conflict
The AMP and the government seem to be determined to achieve their
goals. The government is mostly using a coercive strategy while
the AMP is using nonviolent means. The government’s use of force
seeks to achieve the following: convert the farmers from tenants
to lessees, claim most of the produce cultivated by the farmers,
and stay in control of the land. However, farmers are not that
easily coerced into giving up their lands and are ready to fight
for their tenantship rights through nonviolent protests and other
means. Both parties are following different agendas and different
strategies, therefore, a closer analysis of the strategies used by
the parties will better explain the situation.
The Punjab Seed Corporation, along with the government, uses
numerous tactics to achieve its goals: intimidation, last chance
offers, legal obstacles to farmers rights, and promises that are
never met. For the government, it is much easier to use these
means because they have military and other resources. Moreover,
the government keeps pushing ahead with it tactics, which cause
numerous human rights violations against their citizens.
In order to illustrate the severity of the situation in Punjab, it
is important to see how the government uses intimidation and other
tactics against the farmers. According to Kriesberg (1998),
coercion is used “… as [an] effort to intimidate and defer or to
force the opponent to comply with the demands made by coercer”
(p.101). For example, there were instances when the leaders and
activists of the AMP have been taken to court and falsely accused
of crimes and misconducts. Villages, in which resistance to the
government’s policies was high, were attacked by the military and
houses of the leaders were raided. The government has also turned
off the water and electricity supply to villages. Moreover, those
farmers that did not pay their share of the crop were labeled as
“defaulters”, and as a result they have no legal rights in the
court of law. After all the damage and suffering caused, the
government would present the farmers with the “last chance offer,”
hoping that the farmers would agree out of despair. It is apparent
that the government combines its strategies with coercive and
persuasive tactics and most of the time, these tactics have been
successful; many of the farmers signed the new lessee agreements.
However, there was one tactic that the government did not succeed
at – turning Muslims and Christians against each other. In the
region where religious segregation has been the primary catalyst
for conflicts, Muslim and Christian farmers in Punjab have united
for a common cause, forgetting their prejudices. What seems to be
even more surprising is that Muslims have been supportive of
Christian leadership.
Interestingly, the AMP uses a nonviolent approach to the conflict,
although their slogan is “ownership or death.” For example,
farmers decided to refuse give the government its share of the
crop and when farmers realized that the government would not
listen, they started burning the crop. Furthermore, some of the
farmers started to build their houses on the land on which they
have no legal rights. However, one of the most fascinating tactics
used by the farmers includes the Thappa Force of Women. In Punjab,
women seem to be more active than men, especially in terms of
resisting police actions; therefore they act as the first line of
defence. The women’s force is called Thappa because thappa – a
wooden stick that is used to wash cloths – is their only weapon.
Along with Thappa Force, “there is a coordinated response
mechanism that has been employed through which a hooter is sounded
if an action is anticipated. When this hooter sounds, virtually
every man, woman, and child emerge from their homes to defend
themselves through non-violent means” (Special SAT Report, 2002).
Although farmers have requested help from international
organizations, not much help has been received. Most of the NGO’s
and Pakistani politicians are afraid to be involved because it
could cause them unwanted problems in the future. The situation is
becoming too dangerous for the farmers; it is evident that
government has the military might to suppress the movement.
Because of government's tactics, farmers are suffering gross human
rights violations. Immediate action needs to be taken to resolve
the situation.
Recommendations
Based on the research on the background and nature of this
conflict, any specific recommendations cannot be made. It is the
opinion of the authors of this report, that in order to choose or
implement any of the options that will be suggested in this paper,
further observation and analysis needs to be done on the ground in
Punjab. Furthermore, the role of culture in Punjab and its
function in conflict resolution in the community should be
explored; it is important to know and explore the cultural
differences between the farmers and the military. The AU Conflict
Analysis team proposes the following as options to be explored,
although we advocate only the Consultation approach at this time.
Nevertheless, as more facts and information become available and
as the dynamics of the conflict change, any of the four options
for may be appropriate. Therefore, the four options are:
1- Mediations
2- Negotiations
3- Do Nothing
4- Consultation
While mediation and negotiation may be suitable interventions in
the future, we believe that the parties are not yet ready. At this
time, it is unlikely that the government could be persuaded to
participate in a negotiation or mediation. Further, the power
asymmetry between the farmers and the military government posses
an obstacle to a fair and productive negotiation or mediation.
The option of doing nothing, although not preferred, was also
considered. This is an egregious land tenure dispute with real
civil rights issues in contention. There is evidence of a
disregard for human rights and needs. Therefore, active human
rights monitoring should be pursued by external, neutral and
impartial party. The government continues to offer the new lessee
agreement as a way out of the conflict. Any intervention must be
weighted against the possible cost. In the case of South Asia,
past and ongoing conflicts show that the human cost of conflict
can be high. The birth of Pakistan was marked by communal violence
in which millions were killed. The Pakistani army has been guilty
of massive human rights violations in Bangladesh. In light of the
Musharaaf government's tenuous hold on legitimate power, it
remains wary of social fermentation. The AU team recognized the
potential for danger to the farmers inherent in any intervention.
At this stage of the conflict, it seems that third party
consultation is the best step towards a amicable and sustainable
relationship, facilitating the process toward resolution of the
conflict. However, before any steps are taken towards
consultation, the question of culture needs to be addressed, and
the following questions considered:
• Who would act as the third party?
• Who would represent each side as participants in the
consultation process?
• What will be the structure and design of the entire consultation
process?
The third party consultants must be trusted by both sides. They
must be perceived by the each party as non-threatening. The
participation of grassroots, religious, and community business
leaders would give the consultation legitimacy. The presence and
expertise of national and international NGOs would provide the
coordination and resources to make it possible, but should
maintain a low profile. In addition, “soft-liner” representatives
would be good candidates to attend the meetings. “Soft-liners”
would have resources and influence on the decision making
processes of the parties, and yet flexible to participate in the
process.
Once the first two questions are addressed, the third party should
facilitate and help participants to agree on the structure and
design of the consultation process. The following is a proposal of
a broad framework for implementation. This framework is divided
into three phases: short, medium, and long term. Each phase deals
with the reality of the situation and tries to move the parties
incrementally towards a more trusting relationship.
Short Term
The team proposes that both parties commit themselves to a series
of small steps or measures toward mutual de-escalation, followed
by a strategy of Confidence Building Measures. The role of the
third party at this stage would encourage the parties to formulate
and implement such a strategy. Currently, there is a need for both
parties to move away from coercive, escalatory strategies and
toward non-coercive, de-escalatory actions.
Mid Term
At this stage, confidence building measures, in conjunction with
participation in consultation, should be pursued with the goal of
achieving an environment that is conducive to collaboration and
problem solving. Also at this time, the participants should
explore the conflict from their own and the other side’s point of
view. The exploration of relational issues will preface the
development of a framework for the resolution of this conflict.
Long Term
Based on our research, we derived three possible scenarios which
would potentially satisfy the goals of the intervention. One would
be that the Tenant Association farmers are allowed to buy the land
at a specially financed rate. This would be inclusive of the
government's demands for reform of the tenant system and free
market reforms. As the Government plans to auction off the land,
farmers would be given special consideration in light of their
history on the land. Concerned NGOs with experience in
micro-finance operations around the world could help to organize
and ensure the financial arrangement and minimize government risk.
Other options include the farmers signing a lessee agreement but
only if it was an extremely long-term lease, not unlike the old
British 99-year leases that were close to ownership. Although this
solution relies on semantics, the use of the other party's
language (lease agreement) can be very effective psychologically.
The last foreseeable option would be for the parties to go back to
some variation of the old tenant agreement. However this seems the
most unlikely of possible options and could result in a continued
cycle of violence.
Conclusion
The AU Conflict Analysis team was asked to provide a report to the
SO identifying possible options for intervention in the Punjab
Land Tenure Dispute. This report presents several possible options
for consideration by the SO. Further analysis and diagnosis of the
conflict, the parties, and potential interventions are required.
Works Cited
Amirali, A. (2002). Rebellion in Pakistan. February 27, 2003,
http://www.zmag.org/contents/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=32&ItemID=2037.
Jacob, P. Farmer's Movement in Khanewal (Peerowal) Punjab. March
6, 2003, email.
Nawaz, K. (2001). Land Tenure. February 25, 2003,
http://pakistan.lead.org/c85nts/rapporteuring%20Reports/Session%203.doc.
Moreau, R. & Hussain, Z. (2002). An army of land grabbers.
February 20, 2003,
http://www.foodfirst.org/action/cgar/pakistanrepression.html.
March 20, 2003, http://www.ms.uky.edu/~naveed/pakistan/facts.html.
March 20, 2003, http://webpost.net/ep/epak/.
March 20, 2003, http://www.pakistaninformation.com/pakistanstats.html.
March 20, 2003, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pk.html.
(2002). IRIN. February 26, 2003, www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=29594.
(2002). Pakistan: Brutal state repression against landless
peasants in Punjab. February 20,
2003, http://www.foodfirst.org/action/cgar/pakistanrepression.html.
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